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 In this paper I would like to defend, against its critics, the possibility of 
a rights-based normative theory of ethics, starting from the view that to 
answer today’s moral questions we cannot avoid to confront with the 
question of what rights and, peculiarly, what moral rights should be granted 
to people, where for ‘moral rights’, I mean ‘rights which are not the product 
of community legislation or social practice, which persist even in the face of 
contrary legislation or practice and which prescribe the boundary beyond 
which neither individuals nor the community may go in pursuit of their 
overall ends’ (1). 
I. 
 Debate is divided over this issue: on the one hand the concept of 
moral rights, its nature, and its relation with the concept of legal rights, are 
being discussed at length (2); on the other, there is a lack of interest in the 
question of the justification of moral rights and the possibility of making 
them a starting point for moral reflection. 
 Thus, while utilitarianism or contractualism are at the centre of 
debate, almost nobody seems interested in the suggestion of examining in 
more detail the idea of a rights-based moral theory (3). It is this state of 
‘neglect’ of the question of the possibility of developing a moral theory 
starting from rights, that led to the idea of this paper in the first place.  
 Working on the conviction that the concept of moral rights can justify 
and explain moral life in a way that allows it to stand up to comparison with 
more established ethical concepts (like that of goal, utility, or duty), this 
paper attempts to explain, through a direct comparison with some of its 
main objections, how the view expressed by a rights-based moral theory 
can resist criticism and represent a valuable starting point for normative 
ethics. 
 But, what does it mean for a moral theory to be based on rights? 
In a broad sense, we can distinguish at least three ways in which a moral 
theory can be based on X: 
- X is assumed as the only indefinite term and the other terms are defined 
on the basis of X; 
- some statements on X are assumed as fundamental and the other 
statements are derived from these, even with the help of non-moral, purely 
factual premises; 
- the fundamental statements on X do not merely constitute the starting 
point of the theory, but rather its aim too, in the sense that any proposition 
derived (which can also contain elements not directly based on X) will have 
as its aim the defense and the promotion of X. 
 It is in this last sense that we look to a rights-based moral theory, one 
in which the various aspects of moral reflection may well seem as not 
based on rights, but will still have rights as their aim, and the defense and 
promotion of rights will decide their moral force (4). 
 There are two very general forms of skepticism regarding a morality 
based on rights: on one hand the view that rights are too ‘weak’ a basis for 
an ethical theory because they are not able to capture the salient aspects 
of life and moral reflection; on the other, that human beings deserve a 
higher form of morality than one based on rights, because the discussion of 
rights is fed by social inequality and individualism. More or less all the 
objections we will now examine revolve around these forms of skepticism.  
II. 
a) A morality based on rights does not allow us to grasp the meaning and 
the moral weight of ordinary reasons for action 
 This objection is well exemplified by the peremptory words of R. 
Louden: "Right-based theories are conceptually and normatively 
impoverished […] Their lack of conceptual resources prevents right-based 
theorists from offering guidance on many important moral problems" (5).  
 The idea is that a rights-based morality would only be able to give an 
account of actions based on the rights-duties correlativity, such as 
promises, contracts, etc., and not ordinary actions, which are not 
necessarily compulsory nor depend directly on the rights of someone, 
actions like the pursuit of certain objectives, the exercise of certain 
prerogatives, or the display of certain virtues. 
The idea that rights give rise to an ‘impoverished’ morality is associated 
with two prejudices, that the discussion of rights has to do only with duties 
and the correlativity between rights and duties (6), and that the idea of a 
narrow morality, that is a morality concerned only with action and restriction 
for action (7), is unacceptable, and hence leads to the failure of attempting 
to base moral reflection on rights, since only as a narrow morality can we 
talk of a rights-based morality. 
 At most, the discussion of rights concerns a part, perhaps even slight, 
of morality. Some, for example, think that rights have to do merely with 
freedom and its restrictions, or with the interests of individuals which are to 
be protected through a system of correlation between rights and duties and 
no more. 
 The first prejudice goes back at least to J. Bentham, who was 
persuaded that having a right simply means being the ‘beneficiary’ of a duty 
(8), prejudice which is today at the basis of the so called interest’s theories, 
according to which the only function of rights is to promote the individuals’ 
interests by ensuring benefits, that is, essentially through the imposition of 
duties (9). Whether or not rights can be translated in terms of duties, the 
morality they give rise to only regards the corresponding benefits and 
obligations which can derive from an individual’s pursuit of his or her 
interests. Rights and duties are intrinsically correlatives. 
 But a rights-based moral theory will be based on a system of basic 
rights, among which can figure the right to mind one’s own business and to 
pursue one’s own interests, as well as others. And, at first sight at least, it 
seems J. Feinberg is right when affirming that "it is difficult to imagine how 
one could know what one ought to do (generally) without first determining 
what rights various persons are likely to have against one and which of 
these rights are likely to be waived" (10). That is, it seems not so 
implausible to defend the moral priority of your rights over my duties.  
 Besides, it seems to me that rights are neither freedom nor interests, 
neither claims nor ‘disguised’ duties, as Bentham thought. They seem, 
rather, to be titles. Indeed, we can consider that what qualifies the nature of 
a right is that it confers on its possessor a title to something, and it is the 
position of entitlement of moral agents with respect to whatsoever aspect of 
their moral life (and not, necessarily, only with respect to someone) which 
can direct ethics towards rights, and not the pursuit of specific elements 
such as interests, freedom, or duties. 
 Depending on the circumstances and the elements at stake, the title 
in question can concern freedom, interests, goods, or duties, but it will be 
the entitlement which will determine its special priority in moral discourse. 
This does not mean that the concept of rights be reduced to that of title: the 
concept of rights remains primitive, but it is explained by means of the idea 
of title. A right is what gives rise to a title, endowed by merit of right, with a 
special priority and a permissive force. By means of the concept of title, 
thus, it seems also easier to give an account of the salient features of moral 
rights in ethical reflection, that is their special priority and their eminently 
permissive and relational character. 
 Anyway, it is because of the relational character of rights that rights 
and duties have been so persistently conceived together. When a right is 
affirmed or vindicated by an individual, someone else is ‘affected’ by this 
affirmation, etc. But this does not mean that a rights-duties relationship is 
necessarily created. This correlation does not seem at all necessary in 
understanding the value of the concept of moral rights.  
 The notion of title shows this clearly: we can have a relationship in 
which the part ‘affected' by the right abstains from doing anything, precisely 
by virtue of the permissiveness of the title. Consider the famous examples 
of D. Lyons, regarding rights which do not have corresponding duties (11), 
or the emblematic cases of the duties of charity, etc., which have no 
corresponding rights. Or again, ambiguous cases such as the right-duty to 
vote (12). 
 The judgment of an impoverished morality, then, derives from a 
certain conception of what it means for a moral theory to admit rights: "A 
moral theory admits the existence of rights if it considers the interests of an 
individual a sufficient reason for maintaining that some other individual is 
subject to duties" (13). 
 It is this conception which is poor and reductive for rights. It is not 
generally a morality of rights to be impoverished, but rather a morality of 
rights based only on W. Hohfeld’s analysis and on a justification of the type 
offered by the interest’s theories. 
 In this respect, the rival of the interest’s theories, that is the choice’s 
theories, which maintain that, whatever the interests at stake, the central 
value in the life of individuals is their capacity to choose and their 
autonomy, are more convincing to hold the idea of a rights-based moral 
theory. 
 Although even choice’s theories end up by tying rights to duties 
(since the power of choice is exercised by imposing duties on others), what 
is important for us is the idea that rights guarantee individuals the capacity 
to choose regarding their life. 
 The idea suggested by choice’s theories can thus be reinterpreted by 
distinguishing between theory and praxis of rights: the question of what 
duties correlate to a certain right comes after (and not necessarily) the 
existence and the function of the right in question have been recognized, 
that is to say, in practice. The correlation with duties is not necessary from 
a theoretical point of view in order to assert the existence of a right: it will 
depend on practice.  
 All this shows, even though it is not possible to treat the question 
extensively here, that the rights-duties correlativity is not at all necessary to 
the existence and the recognition of moral rights, which can stress, as 
regard to duties at least, full conceptual and justificatory autonomy.  
 If all of this is true, we can also take another look at the criteria for 
normative ethics. It is certainly true that a normative theory has to do with 
actions first of all, and that its acceptability is therefore tied to its ability to 
provide rules for action; but normative ethics, as the ‘anti-theorists’ have 
argued (14), is not obliged to provide universal prescriptive criteria for 
moral action and is not obliged to extend beyond the confines of a narrow 
morality, as Mill rightly said when he stated that the moral rules which 
prevent individuals from coming into conflicts with each other are the most 
vital rules for human well-being (15). 
 Thus, a normative theory of rights can represent a ‘self-critical, non-
intellectualistic, and socially responsible moral philosophy’ (16), and fulfill 
with dignity the task indicated by narrow morality of regulating conflicts 
between the freedoms and interests of moral agents, ensuring that 
everyone is respected and held reasonably in consideration.  
b) Through rights you cannot manage to identifying precise ethical criteria 
Only through consequentialist or deontological reasoning is it possible to 
arrive at precise ethical criteria. A rights-theory, that is, is fundamentally 
characterized by a lack of rational coherence, by a ‘genetic’ incapacity to 
give rise to a complete and autonomous theoretical framework. Rights, 
therefore, have to be viewed only within theoretical frameworks such as 
utilitarianism, consequentialism, contractualism, or deontologism. 
 At the basis of this opinion there seems to be a prejudice regarding 
the value of rationality in ethics: why must the determination of a precise 
ethical criterion depend solely on forms of monistic rationality, such as 
utilitarianism, or deductive rationality, such as the neokantian theory of 
Gewirth? 
 Prudential forms of rationality, conforming to pluralist argumentative 
models and games theories, with particular emphasis on criteria for the 
resolution of conflicts based on cooperation and negotiation, can carry out 
the main task of normative ethics, of guiding the actions of individuals, 
equally well (17). 
 In a theory of rights, moreover, goals and duties can be justified in the 
light of rights: duties can be used to realize the normative power of rights, 
in practice; while goals can serve to put into practice, through substantive 
and institutional rights, prima facie, fundamental, abstract rights, which 
constitute the framework of the theory (18). 
c) A moral theory of rights is not capable of resolving conflicts 
 Theories of rights have dealt at length with the problem of conflicts, 
starting from the evidence they do not have an ultimate criterion or principle 
to which they can refer in case of conflicts between competitive rights. 
Conflicts between, say, the moral right of a pregnant woman to decide what 
happens in and to her body and the moral right of the fetus to life, or 
between the fundamental right to life of an aggressor and the right to self-
defense of the victim of the aggression are to be solved directly, weighting 
the interests, needs, ideals and so on at stake, on a case by case basis, 
looking for compromises worked out in practice and not a priori. The 
general problem, so, is ‘How can a theory of rights resolve the irreducible 
conflict of rights?’ Two questions are involved in this problem: first, are 
conflicts between rights even possible? And, secondly, if they are possible, 
how could we try to solve them? 
 The first question is directly tied to the absolutism with which rights 
are usually conceived: we usually think to have an inalienable or absolute 
right to, say, life, liberty and property. But, if things are left in this way, the 
second question does not arise at all: between two absolute competitive 
rights we cannot even discuss the possibility to solve their conflict on a 
case by case basis.  
 It is for these reasons that among theorists of rights have become 
consolidated the proposal of considering rights not from an absolutist point 
of view, but rather through the notion of prima facie, the notion first 
introduced by D. Ross for duties, but today mostly in use for describing 
moral concepts liable to be weighed against each other without necessarily 
being traded-off (19). 
 Describing a right as prima facie has the primary function to indicate 
that it is not absolute and that it is not possible, if not case by case, to 
provide a definitive account of its weight. This allows us to offer a plausible 
explanation as to why a right, in given circumstances, can be infringed 
without being violated, and it indicates, therefore, a way of approaching, if 
not resolving, conflicts. And so we can try to answer the second question. 
 In given circumstances, that is, a certain right can be overwhelmed by 
other considerations or other rights, through mechanisms of negotiation or 
strategic interaction, or through criteria of comparative evaluation of the 
moral priority of rights or the elements through which these rights enter into 
conflict.  
 For example, we could think in terms of a model in which each 
person is represented by a point-centre of force and the forces (the prima 
facie rights) obey an inverse square law: "there will be some matters so 
close to each person that, with respect to them, his rights will nearly always 
outweigh any aggregate of other rights, though admittedly it will sometimes 
happen that issues arise in which the equally vital interests of two or more 
people clash" (20). 
 But, anyway, by means of this model we look for compromises which 
will have to be worked out in practice and, so, will be morally defensible in 
so far as they reflect the equality in value, that is the equal weight in front of 
violation, of the prima facie rights.  
 It has to be noticed that, in this way, the value of a certain right 
remains unaltered and its reclaiming preserves the characteristic of 
universalization which is demanded by morality. Even if my prima facie 
right to, say, free speech is, in some circumstances, infringed by the right of 
others non to be disturbed, my right remains universally valid, in so far it 
has not been violated and can be applied, in the correct circumstances, 
when its weighing with other competitive rights will assign priority to it. All 
this, then, allows us to explain how a theory of rights, in normal 
circumstances, can deal with conflicts (21). 
 But the more interesting suggestion is about the possibility of 
explaining, differently, the infringement and the violation of rights in the light 
of a two-level strategy. A theory of rights could in fact make use of 
something similar to R.M. Hare’s ‘two-level’ reasoning (22) and explain the 
infringement of a given right by means of the distinction between what 
happens at the intuitive level and what happens at the critical level: at the 
critical level, the right is not violated since it is fully considered, while at the 
intuitive level the right might, on the basis of reflections at the critical level 
regarding the comparison with other rights and the need for cooperation, be 
infringed. But, let’s clarify this point. 
 The utilitarian thinker R.M. Hare attempts to explain the centrality of 
rights in contemporary moral thought by referring to his two-levels theory, 
within which rights are justified by virtue of the ‘egalitarianism of interests’ 
(23). At the intuitive level, he says, we see individuals appealing to a lot of 
conflicting rights; at the critical level, we use the utilitarian principle of the 
equal consideration of the interests of all as the criterion to explain the real 
value of the intuitive rights and to solve their apparent conflicts.  
 But this idea, defended by Hare, of basing moral reasoning on the 
distinction between the two levels of thought, can be taken up again within 
a moral theory of rights, by reading it, so to speak, the other way round. 
Rights, that is, can be conceived of as reasons excluding utilitarian 
motives, reasons of the second level which are able to exclude utilitarian 
reasons of the first level. That is, through the distinction between the two 
levels of thought, it is possible to determine principles for the resolution of 
conflicts between rights which respond to criteria of negotiation and debate, 
and not to higher criteria of utility to which the rights themselves lead. 
 Transactions like promising, for example, lend themselves well to 
confirming the possibility of applying the two-level reasoning within a theory 
of rights: at the intuitive level we observe the right-duty relationship just as 
fixed by their correlativity; at the critical level, we account both for the 
bonds of compulsoriness and those of entitlement (which a promise 
confers, respectively, on he who promises and he who receives the 
promise), through one or more fundamental rights possessed by all 
individuals as moral agents. 
 At the intuitive level, therefore, the enormous proliferation of the 
appeal to rights, the ‘rhetoric of rights’ which seems to characterize the 
contemporary ethical debate could be explained; at the critical level, it 
would be possible to justify the centrality of the concept of rights for 
normative ethics and the method of looking for compromises which will be 
worked out in practice by means of a case by case basis. A method that 
can easily be considered ‘weak’, in the sense of a refusal of a rationally 
stringent derivation from an unitary principle, as in utilitarianism, but that 
can avoid the unpalatable results of trade-offs. 
 Besides, by means of the two-level strategy we can also explain the 
relation there is between the concrete, institutional rights which individuals 
claim case by case and the cluster of formal abstract prima facie rights 
which individuals appeal to in order to resolve conflicts. That is, at the 
intuitive level, we see the particular, substantive rights as they are 
conceived by individuals; at the critical level we understand the reason of 
that substantive rights and explain their conflict in the light of prima facie, 
abstract rights, which will form a model on the basis of which to construct a 
theory of rights.  
 Even if all of this is true, there is another aspect of the question. The 
problem at this point, in fact, is not the infringement of a certain right in 
given circumstances of practical conflict at the ‘intuitive’ level, but rather its 
violation at the level of ‘critical’ thought. The violation of a right, in fact, 
directly involves an injustice towards its possessor. 
 Violating a right means not considering its moral force at any level, 
not taking it into consideration, at the critical level, in negotiation or 
interaction. The sense of moral indignation, of ‘injustice’ which is created in 
consequence of the violation of a right, is, in this sense, an important 
indicator of the special status which rights enjoy within moral life and 
thought (24). 
 The main difficulty concerning the violation of rights, therefore, is to 
establish on what bases we must distinguish between the violation of a 
right, which is unjust, and its infringement, which, however, is lawful. 
Appealing to some higher principle which does not depend on rights is 
tempting; but we could try to solve the difficulty directly on the level of 
relations between prima facie, fundamental rights and not on the basis of 
their derivation from something else. 
 The solution is offered in the light of the two-level strategy, 
distinguishing between concrete, institutional rights and prma facie, 
abstract rights and also by means, for example, of the concept of 
compensation and those judicial practices relative to the questions of 
sanction and responsibility. It is not possible to examine these questions in 
detail here, but the suggestion is that a theory of rights can solve conflicts 
between competitive ideals, needs, interests and so on without violating 
any rights of individuals, working out compromises and infringements at a 
practical level, by means of the criteria of justice, a sort of intermediate 
between the ‘two levels’ of rights.  
 It is in this way that a theory of rights shows its profound link with the 
concept of justice and proves the possibility of giving an account of such 
important aspects of moral and social practice as justice of actions and 
institutions and justice in the cases of responsibility and punishment and in 
transactions between moral agents, without appealing to some unitary 
principle as in the case of Hare’s egalitarianism of interests (25). 
 A theory of rights, thus, starting from an abstract system of prima 
facie, fundamental, moral rights can directly intervene in the affairs of social 
justice - as the theories of Nozick, Dworkin, or Rawls demonstrate. But, 
rather than asserting that moral rights are the means of maintaining the 
justice of social institutions, we could say that justice is the means of 
maintaining, promoting, realizing, modifying, and so on, the system of 
prima facie, fundamental, abstract rights which is developed at the critical 
level. 
 If, that is, the starting point is not institutions, but rather the abstract 
system of prima facie, fundamental, moral rights, the link between justice 
and rights, between actions and institutions, can be maintained and 
consolidated in the light of the ways in which a substantive system can be 
derived from a formal system, without the intervention of higher universal 
principles, but rather through negotiation, compensation, cooperation, and 
interaction. 
 Surely, substantive, institutional rights can stray, even quite 
considerably, from the prima facie rights they derive from. But this is due to 
the complex, stratified ways in which a substantive theory can relate to the 
formal model from which it derives. The derivation of substantive rights can 
be a complicated operation, and it is important to distinguish the system of 
institutional rights which it is the task of institutions to defend and promote, 
from the system of prima facie, fundamental rights from which they derive 
on the basis of a moral theory grounded on rights. 
 From this we can say that a theory of rights can deal with conflicts, 
since prima facie rights can be considered within this theory as morally 
fundamental without being absolute, and it is precisely in this that their 
strength and special priority lie. Substantive, institutional rights, those that 
are taken up, claimed, infringed, etc., in practice, derive their raison d’être 
precisely from prima facie, fundamental, abstract rights. 
d) The discussion of rights is fed by social inequality because it is a highly 
individualistic morality 
 The idea is that asserting and defending rights obeys the law of the 
most advantaged individual: he who is in the position to claim rights takes 
advantage of a system, like that of rights, which upholds these positions of 
advantage, to the disadvantage of he who is not in a position to claim 
rights.  
 However, the idea seems fundamentally vitiated by a 
misunderstanding of what it means to claim a right, and how far the 
concept of rights extend. Indeed the concept of rights constitutes a highly 
complex and polysemic element, and its reclaiming cannot be reduced 
within the limits of a advantage-disadvantage relationship between 
individuals. Indeed, it is often precisely the disadvantaged who claim rights. 
 What qualifies a rights-theory is not extreme individualism, but 
pluralism, that is, first of all, the respect for the separateness of individuals: 
it is precisely in the name of pluralism that we can recognize that a rights-
based morality is a morality worthy of human beings.  
 Through pluralism, besides, the concept of the individual is also able 
to value collective claims and group rights, without giving up its own 
autonomy from society (26). The individual is fully realized only within 
society and yet is an end to himself: society only serves towards his 
realization, and not vice versa. 
 On closer inspection, then, a theory like utilitarianism for example, 
apparently among those most opposed to individualism, ends up by being 
even more individualistic than a rights-theory. On the question of 
individualism, the confrontation between utilitarianism and rights could turn 
nasty, since it is possible to argue that at the basis of the utilitarian 
calculation there is a highly individualistic vision of moral value, and that 
this calculation is none other than an authorization to mass selfishness 
(27). 
 Individualism, therefore, whether or not it is a problem for rights, is 
not a problem only for rights. 
e) Collective goods cannot be integrated into an individualistic morality like 
that based on rights 
 This criticism is a direct consequence of the preceding one. Here too, 
the idea is that, if the individual is the only sphere in which rights can be 
understood, it is impossible to speak in any way of collective entities for 
which goods, interests, or other are appropriated. But collective goods are 
expressions of the plurality of social relations, of moral perspectives, 
precisely those things which a rights-theory seeks to defend.  
 The existence and recognition of so-called group-rights, for example, 
shows clearly that a rights-theory can give value to the collective 
dimension. It is said that group-rights are none other than ‘magnified’ forms 
- that is, groupings within isolated communities - of individual rights. But, if 
this is true, the same could be said of collective utility. 
 So called group-rights, however, appear more like titles put forward 
by a form of collectivity with respect to power or society, than individual 
rights interpreted in the light of some communitary practice. The example of 
the collective right to self-determination is often quoted: it is not just a 
question of a public good, but of a true collective right to be invoked even 
against public power in the case of abuses or a failure to recognize the 
autonomy of the group or collectivity in question.  
 It is objected, however, that the so-called collective right to self-
determination is none other than the expression of an interest, by the 
individuals who make up the group, in their own autonomy. In this way, 
such a right would be reduced to the sum of the individual interests 
regarding self-determination. The same is said for other collective rights, 
like the right to information, to a certain cultural identity, and so on. But, if 
the rights represent first and foremost titles, and not interests, to claim to or 
to defend, there is no difficulty either in recognizing the legitimacy of 
collective titles and goods, nor in reconciling the idea of self-determination 
with the rights-theory, since the basis of the right to autonomy is pluralism, 
and not individualism (28).  
 The idea of collective goods, then, can be fully integrated into a 
rights-based moral theory, just as much as the idea of individual goods, 
and it is no good objecting that collective goods necessitate communitary 
or aggregative theoretical perspectives, such as utilitarianism or 
communitarism. Separate rights taken separately do not exist ‘before 
society’; they exist ‘in society’ and are the genuine expression of its plurality 
and richness.  
f) A morality based on rights cannot attribute an intrinsic moral value to 
virtues and the pursuit of excellence 
 Virtue has to do with character and not actions: what use can a 
rights-theory make of virtues other than an instrumental one, just like 
utilitarian theories? 
 This objection, besides being fundamentally marred by the idea that 
rights are only concerned with duties (and hence that we cannot speak of 
virtue just as we cannot within theories of duties), is also upheld by the 
opinion that a rights-theory is another way, just like utilitarian theory, of 
instrumentalizing morality with a view to promoting and defending rights. 
 But rights have also to do with good and not only with duty, as it is 
clear by now if we consider that rights are first of all titles which invest 
individuals with the capacity to choose how to act, that is, how to realize 
their own good. As Aristotle teaches, virtue is pursued through action, and 
the good which rights are linked to can easily be conceived of, according to 
the Aristotelian idea of eudaimonia, as something which has to do with the 
activity of moral agents (29). 
 And, if this is true, good dispositions, like virtues (for example, the 
virtue of benevolence), can be integrated into a rights-theory and the 
pluralistic vision which it promotes in an acceptable fashion. 
 The virtue of benevolence, that is to say, the good disposition 
regarding the good of others, far from being a factor independent of rights 
and obligations, is required of anyone who has rights or is linked to anyone 
who has rights. In fact, duty makes no sense if there is not some 
disposition towards the good of others, just as respect for rights makes no 
sense if there is not some interest in the good of others. 
 Virtues, then, can accompany a rights-theory with profit: the 
recognition, respect, promotion, and defense of rights cannot be merely 
compulsory or instrumental affairs in the life of moral agents. The idea that 
rights and duties do not involve demands for a good disposition towards 
others does not seems to be in any way plausible. 
g) A morality based on rights does not allow a moral meaning to be given to 
supererogation 
 Supererogation is identified with action that goes beyond duty: an act 
is supererogatory if it is praiseworthy and not wrong, that is, if it is morally 
permissible not to do it. 
 That a rights-based morality cannot account for this type of action is 
the opinion which derives, yet again, from the prejudice that within such a 
morality we can only speak of rights and duties: virtue, merit, excellence 
are supposedly eccentric, respect to a rights-morality. 
 But, as noted above with regard to virtue, this is by no means true. 
The objection, moreover, has little value if it is only directed at rights, 
because we could also say the same thing, for example, about a morality of 
duty, seeing that supererogation is an act ‘beyond duty’. How can we justify 
a duty to act in a supererogatory way? 
 In the same way, how can we justify a supererogatory act in the light 
of some goal extrinsic to it? We surely cannot say that acting in a 
supererogatory way is useful, or appropriate to the pursuit of welfare, 
because by doing so, the supererogatory act would lose its characteristics 
of excellence. 
 The problem raised, in essence, does not only concern a morality of 
rights. The type of reasoning that would be appropriate to put forward with 
regard to this problem appeals to the general question, on which the idea of 
narrow morality rests, of the pretensions of normative reflection: to what 
extent can individual’s behaviour be guided by normative ethics? 
 If we are disposed to defend the idea of narrow morality, what moral 
reflection must do is to guide actions and restrictions on action and not 
justify every aspect of moral life. There are aspects of moral life which can 
contribute to the smooth running of actions, to perspectives such as those 
based on rights, but which must not necessarily be ‘explained’ in terms of 
rights or other. 
 Virtue, excellence, supererogation, are aspects of morality which do 
not need restrictions and guidance: they need to be recognized with praise 
and merit, and these elements can appear in the normal social relations 
which accompany the defence, revendication, and promotion of rights. 
III. 
 In the light of the general picture which emerges from the criticisms 
faced above, we can draw the positive conclusion suggested at the 
beginning: a rights-based moral theory, albeit through doubts and 
difficulties, really does seem possible, and for the following reasons at 
least:  
- Rights are good candidates for satisfying the demands of normative 
ethical reflection. Such reflection can in fact be conceived in the manner of 
both the ‘anti-theorists’ and Hume as "a self-critical, non intellectualistic and 
socially responsible moral philosophy" and, therefore, base itself on a 
concept, like that of rights, which provides acceptable but not 
rationalistically and intellectualistically stringent criteria for moral reflection. 
- Rights are good candidates for guiding action. If it is true that normative 
reflection shows itself to be more coherent within the limits of a narrow 
morality, rights can fulfill the task of guiding moral action in an acceptable 
fashion. 
- The discourse on rights can satisfy the criteria of impartiality and 
universality required by normative ethics. Impartiality, in the form of a 
fundamental right to equal respect or equal consideration and respect, or 
again, to equal respect in the balancing between various rights, is satisfied 
in the perspective offered by rights; indeed, equality is one of the most 
salient points in the history of the discussion of rights. And even 
universalizability, if difficult to realize through the idea of absoluteness 
(because of the problem of conflicts, the question of cultural relativism, and 
also the impossibility of grasping the infinite turns of moral life), can, 
through the idea of prima facie, be properly integrated into rights-based 
moral reflection. 
- Rights, therefore, can satisfy the task required of any normative ethical 
theory, just as well as other ethical notions. Rights, that is, come to 
constitute the basis for a moral theory which can tackle with dignity the task 
of regulating conflicts between liberties, needs, interests, etc. of various 
moral agents and to ensure that each one is respected and held 
reasonably in consideration. 
- The normative system based on rights can account for, perhaps better 
than others, the pluralism which characterizes moral life. Pluralism, in fact, 
beginning with respect for the separateness of individuals, is one of the 
fundamental features of the discussion of rights; and, if it is starting from 
the individuals that prima facie, fundamental, abstract rights are formulated, 
it is, however, in the name of cooperation, negotiation, and debate, that a 
rights-based moral theory can account for moral life. 
- The other relevant ethical notions and a systematic moral reflection can 
be derived from a system of rights. Derivation, in fact, in a rights-based 
moral theory, is not to be taken in the strict sense, but rather in the light of a 
criterion of reasonableness. It is in this sense, as we have said, that goals 
and duties can be justified in the light of rights, their defence and 
promotion. 
- A rights-theory can therefore be based on rights in the most important 
sense, as we said above, in which a moral theory can be based on X. 
- A rights-based theory can tackle the problem of conflicts to the same 
extent as theories based on utility or duties can. Principles of negotiation or 
debate, methods of cooperation, and comparative evaluation of titles that 
holders of rights boast, together, for example, with a two-level method of 
reasoning (in which rights represent second-level reasons which can 
exclude utilitarian, deontological, or any other type of first-level reasons), 
allow the problem of conflicts to be tackled, even within a perspective 
based on rights, particularly if the rights are conceived of as prima facie. 
- A rights-theory can be presented as a ‘third alternative’ respect to 
consequentialism or deontologism, an alternative which can accept 
elements of a deontological or consequentialist nature, but whose 
framework is based on characteristics proper to rights, such as their special 
priority or their permissive force. It is possible, for example, to base a moral 
theory on rights by looking to some concept of a valuable life, because this 
criterion does not imply considerations directed to welfare. The criterion of 
a valuable life, in fact, involves only admitting that if a human life has no 
value or if some lives have more intrinsic value than others, then this is by 
virtue of the quality of their life. (1)Just as it is possible, through rights, to 
look at the good in moral life or the interests of moral agents, without 
having to turn to criteria of measurement of consequences, or maximization 
of good or interests, and limiting the consequentialist elements to an 
instrumental position in the light of the defense and realization of rights in 
practice.  
- The criticisms directed against this type of theory do not seem to be more 
serious that those which can be directed against consequentialist or 
deontolgical theories. Questions like those of conflicts, inequality, or 
supererogation, strike at the heart of normative ethical reflection and not 
just at a reflection based on rights. 
 We can therefore draw the following conclusions. 
IV. 
 Everything said so far, in fact, allows us to assert the idea that, by 
looking to some formal model (starting from the determination of one or 
more fundamental, abstract, prima facie rights), we can substantially 
derive, through principles of articulation and rules of derivation - in 
essence, as said above, through rules of justice and social cooperation and 
coordination - a system of moral rights, which serves as a guide for moral 
action. It is in this way that we can have a system of substantive, 
institutional, concrete rights, which can be judged in the light of the model 
of prima facie, fundamental, abstract rights. 
 All this does not dispense us from being conscious of the difficulties 
and the ambiguities that a moral theory of rights inevitable has to face, 
particularly when it no longer has to outline a formal model, but a 
substantive one. 
 But the possibility that a rights-based moral theory can tackle with 
dignity the task of guiding moral action seems an important point. It must 
be remembered above all that the force of a normative perspective, like 
that based on rights, lies in the possibility that it offers of reading the 
polyvalence and plurality, that is to say, the richness of moral life, through a 
system in which it is in any case possible, starting from a basic notion - that 
of moral rights - to derive other ethically relevant notions; but in which 
derivation is not conceived of in a strict sense, but rather by searching for, 
in the manifold reasoning of moral thought, a manifestation of the desire to 
attribute all individuals, equally (even given the greatest respect for 
differences and separateness), with the greatest opportunity of acting, in 
conformity with their own plans, but also with the need for cooperation and 
negotiation which derive from human coexistence. 
 It is from this force, surely, that a rights-theory also derives its 
greatest difficulties, since in the lack of some unitary criterion, the solution 
of conflicts first of all, and the evaluation of concrete cases in the light of a 
theoretical structure, becomes particularly difficult. 
 But it remains that moral life is too varied and pluralistic to be reduced 
to any unitary criterion. Forms of strategic rationality and limitations on the 
prescriptive force can help moral thought ‘to be more realistic’. 
 In conclusion, then, it seems clear that talking of moral rights in our 
contemporary world can be more than mere rhetoric or ‘ideological 
inflation’, and it is to be hoped that moral debate will dedicate itself, as it 
has done with utilitarianism and deontologism, to develop specific ethical 
theories based on moral rights. 
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